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THE CASE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS
Patrick J. Glen
ABSTRACT
Chevron skepticism is in vogue in legal academia, as
Professors Shoba Wadhia and Christopher Walker’s recent entry in
the genre demonstrates. They place their project within the broader
academic trend of arguing for limitations on the application of
deference to various administrative decisions, but their aim is
ultimately narrower—to show that “this case against Chevron has
* * * its greatest force when it comes to immigration.”
The Professors are incorrect. Immigration adjudication
presents one of the strongest cases for deference to administrative
adjudication. This case is founded in the text of the statute itself and
its myriad general and specific delegations of authority to the
Attorney General, the expertise of the agency which has honed its
interpretive enterprise through adjudicating tens of thousands of
cases annually, and the ultimate political accountability of the
agency head in immigration adjudication. For these reasons, the
Supreme Court has applied Chevron deference to immigration
adjudications since the very foundation of that framework.
Although they advance an interesting contrarian thesis, the
Professors ultimately provide no sound basis for retreating from
four decades of established jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent article, published as part of Duke Law Journal’s annual Administrative Law
Symposium, Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher Walker argue that Chevron
deference should not be applied to immigration adjudications, specifically, the decisions of the
Board of Immigration Appeals in removal proceedings.1 This is a provocative thesis, contrary as
it is to nearly four decades of federal court decisions, including repeated affirmations of Chevron’s
applicability to immigration adjudications by the Supreme Court. It is sure to prompt further
debate in academia, as well as the federal courts, and to the extent it forces all interested parties to
reconsider the justifications for and application of deference principles, it will be an important
article.2
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If the article has a fundamental shortcoming, however, it is perspectival: the Professors
write largely from outside the system they are critiquing. That does not undercut the strength that
many of their points carry, but it does provide an opening for a riposte from within the system.
Having litigated the Chevron issue for the government in the immigration context before both the
federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, my views differ significantly both in how the
justifications for deference are framed and with the bottom-line conclusion that adjudications
should categorically be denied deference. On my account, I would place significant weight on
Congress’s delegations to the Attorney General in the Immigration and Nationality Act and the
background principle of plenary power, which may be weakened in its contemporary form but is
far from dead. Even assuming deference must be justified with resort to principles beyond
Congress’s explicit delegations, immigration adjudications pass that bar: such adjudications are
the poster-child for political accountability, as the Attorney General sits at the apex of the
adjudicatory bureaucracy, and the agency possesses both the craft and legislative expertise that the
Professors view as integral to the agency’s decision-making process. Finally, it is important to
note that rule-making—the Professors’ preferred avenue for immigration policy-making—and
adjudication often serve different purposes, a point with special importance under the INA, a
statute that makes clear those circumstances where Congress mandated rulemaking and those
where the agency has a freer hand to chose the method for implementing policy. The agency
should be entitled to deference regardless of the path it choses, so long as its decision is otherwise
reasonable.
Part I begins by placing the Chevron issue in context. Although the immigration
bureaucracy is a sprawling system of adjudication encompassing hundreds of thousands of
adjudications each year before both immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
Chevron deference is concerned with a vanishingly small minority of cases. And in that small
minority of cases, the decision-making of the Board is robust and comprehensive. Part II then
proceeds to the meat of the issue, arguing for why Chevron deference to immigration adjudications
is appropriate. This section addresses the main points already highlighted above: the explicit
general and specific statutory delegations to the Attorney General and the background principle of
the Executive Branch’s plenary power in immigration; the political accountability in immigration
adjudication via the Attorney General’s referral authority; and the significant institutional expertise
the Board brings to bear in resolving cases through precedent-setting adjudications. Finally, Part
III argues that there is no substantial reason to prefer rulemaking to adjudication when it comes to
affording deference to the agency’s determinations, while highlighting the complementary roles
each often plays in the development and promulgation of policy.
I. PLACING CHEVRON IN CONTEXT: IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATIONS AND THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ DECISIONAL PROCESS
Professors Wadhia and Walker lay out at some length the structure of the immigration
adjudicatory system and its operational realities. Rather than retread that ground, it is worthwhile
to address two additional points that are especially relevant for addressing the Chevron question:
the scope of Chevron’s potential applicability to immigration adjudications, and the decisional
process the Board engages in when issuing decisions entitled to Chevron deference.
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First, Chevron’s potential scope. The immigration adjudication system is massive,
encompassing 65 immigration courts and 529 immigration judges,3 as well as the Board of
Immigration Appeals, an appellate body that now has 23 permanent members.4 In 2020,
immigration courts received 367,038 new cases, completed 231,435, and ended the year with a
backlog of 1,256,954 cases.5 In the same year, the Board received 51,266 new appeals, resolved
33,973 appeals, and ended the year with 84,716 appeals pending.6 Such a high workload may,
from a 30,000 foot view, lend credence at the threshold to an argument that deference is not
appropriate to immigration adjudications. Professor Wadhia and Walker hint at this argument
throughout their article, noting not only high case loads but also certain variances in case outcomes
based on which immigration court is conducting the proceeding and whether the alien is
represented.7 These factors may undercut the contention that deference is warranted, because they
point to a system that is incapable of engaging in the type of reasoned adjudication that should
undergird a decision claiming entitlement to deference.8
For that reason, it is worthwhile drilling down through the system to focus on that narrow
class of decisions—out of the hundreds of thousands of cases that will be resolved by immigration
judges and the Board in any given year—for which the question of Chevron deference would be a
live issue. Deference applies only when the adjudicator “acts in its lawmaking capacity and, in
the case of the BIA’s adjudications, that means only when the BIA’s decision is binding precedent
within the agency.”9 The Board’s decision is binding as precedent only in circumstances where
the Board issues a published decision,10 and that occurs only rarely in any given year. In 2020,
the Board issued 25 precedential decisions, a number on par with its average yearly output over
the last eight years: 16 (2019), 23 (2018), 27 (2017), 26 (2016), 28 (2015), 29 (2014), 19 (2013).
It is this narrow class of cases alone—representing .07% of the total decisions issued in 2020—
that is relevant for Chevron purposes, as it is only this class of case that falls under the scope of
Section 1003.1(g). But even this calculation overstates the universe of cases to which the
government may ultimately seek deference. Although the Board may issue a precedential decision
on any issue, and although that decision will bind agency adjudicators in the discharge of their
responsibilities, many of these cases will not be entitled to deference before the courts of appeals.
For instance, in many cases the Board decides on the divisibility of state criminal statutes or
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whether such a statute is a categorical match to the generic federal offense,11 the decision will not
be entitled to deference before the courts of appeals even though the decision is a precedential
decision that binds agency adjudicators. This is because the Board is held to have no particular
expertise on state criminal laws, and because the categorical approach implicates a legal analysis
to which deference is not relevant.12 For present purposes, it is enough to note that the universe
of Chevron-eligible decisions in the immigration context is exceedingly narrow, and implicates
less than one-tenth of one percent of all Board decisions issued in any given year.
Second, a corollary of the first point, the decisional-process undergirding the issuance of a
precedential decision is more intensive and deliberative than issuance of single-member decisions.
Precedential decisions are only issued in cases where the Board has sat as a three-member panel
or en banc, and the decision may only be issued as a precedent where the entire Board membership
discusses the case and votes in the affirmative to issue it as such.13 In this sense, every Board
decision is essentially en banc—no precedent issues unless a majority of the Board members
believes it should be so issued. In this way, the work of the Board parallels that of the federal
courts of appeals. The Ninth Circuit may issue only a handful of precedential decisions in any
given week, while issuing 100 unpublished memorandum dispositions.14 Nobody would allege
that a published opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit is somehow lacking in relative deliberative
processes just because the court also issued 20 or more unpublished decisions the same day. What
matters for assessing the adequacy of deliberation is the case at issue, and for the Board and
Chevron purposes that relates only to the vanishingly small number of precedential decisions it
issues in a year, not the thousands of other orders and decisions it will reach.
II. THE CASE FOR CHEVRON DEFERENCE
When a court is confronted with an issue resolved by the Board in a precedential decision,
it should afford deference to that resolution under familiar principles of Chevron deference. This
deference stems from the statute’s own explicit delegations to the Attorney General, and the
comparative expertise and political accountability the agency enjoys in the course of discharging
its adjudicatory functions. Although Professors Wadhia and Walker attempt to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of these justifications for deference in the immigration context, their arguments are
ultimately misguided.
11
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possession of a “dangerous drug”).
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expertise, its interpretations are not entitled to deference.” (alterations in original) (quoting Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d
561, 566 (4th Cir. 2013))); Ramos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We own no Chevron
deference to the Board’s interpretation of the Georgia [criminal] statute, which the Board has no power to
administer.”); Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f the issue turns on the meaning of a federal
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A. Explicit Delegations and Structural Cues
The “statutory” case for Chevron deference in immigration adjudications is simple and
straightforward, and has been recognized by the Supreme Court since its earliest consideration of
the issue. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court recognized that although there will still be strictly
legal questions to which deference will not apply, there are also statutory ambiguities in the INA
“which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In
that process of filling any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress, the courts must respect
the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for
administering the statutory program.”15 The Court clarified its rationale for applying Chevron to
immigration adjudications in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre.16 Given that the INA explicitly provided
that the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law
shall be controlling,”17 the Court deemed it “clear that principles of Chevron deference are
applicable” to immigration adjudications.18 In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court found further support
in the statute’s specific conferral of “decisionmaking authority on the Attorney General” in
determining an alien’s eligibility for withholding of removal,19 as well as its prior recognition “that
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context
where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations.’”20
These latter two points should be emphasized. First, the statute broadly provides authority
to the Attorney General to interpret the statute he is charged with administering, while containing
numerous other delegations of decisional authority akin to what the Supreme Court found
compelling in Aguirre-Aguirre, including provisions relating to: asylum, cancellation of removal,
adjustment of status, and numerous other waivers and additional forms of relief or protection from
removal.21 In other words, the INA is not a statute where courts must discern whether there is an
implied or implicit delegation of authority to resolve statutory ambiguity; Congress has provided
its explicit instruction that the Attorney General’s determinations, made in the course of
discharging his responsibilities and decision-making authority under the INA, should be given
“controlling” weight.22
Second, judicial deference in the immigration context must be placed within the history of
Executive authority over immigration; the Executive’s authority stems not only from the statutory
scheme, but constitutes a background principle inherent in the nature of immigration law. In 1950,
the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the
admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an
15

480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
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5

inherent executive power.”23 In Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court opined that its cases “have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by
the Government’s political department largely immune from judicial control.”24 This simply
restated what it had said a year earlier in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong: “the power over aliens is of
a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial review.”25 For this reason, the
Supreme Court has traditionally, and even still, extended broad deference to the Executive’s
immigration-related decisions because of the specific context of immigration law.
Beyond these principles, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have focused on the
specific expertise of the agency in resolving complicated issues of immigration law, as well as the
policy-oriented disposition of certain issues that permissibly rests with the agency. For instance,
Justice Kagan recently described an immigration case as “the kind of case Chevron was built for.
Whatever Congress might have meant . . . it failed to speak clearly. Confronted with a selfcontradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually
reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying
immigration law.”26 And in the related context of the ordinary-remand-rule, the Court has
appealed to agency expertise in interpreting ambiguous provisions as a rationale for remanding to
the agency rather than a court of appeals addressing legal or statutory interpretation questions in
the first instance.27
This history provides a firm foundation for Chevron’s application. Congress has explicitly
delegated authority to the Attorney General, including to conduct adjudications under the INA,
and this delegation bolsters an inherent Executive authority in the immigration context. Add to
that the expertise the agency has in its sole subject matter focus, and it is little wonder that
deference has been applied to immigration decisions continually since the advent of Chevron.
B. Political Accountability and Attorney General Referral
Immigration adjudication, perhaps more than any other form of contemporary agency
adjudication, offers exactly the type of political accountability that should underpin Chevron
deference. The Professors argue that two types of political accountability should be relevant for
administrative purposes, an “elections matter” conception that advances the “electoral
23

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasis added).
430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citation omitted).
25
426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (citation omitted)
26
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 75 (2014) (plurality op.).
27
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (“This remand rule exists, in part, because ‘ambiguities in statutes
within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in
reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make
than courts.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 524 (on remand, “[t]he agency’s interpretation of the statutory meaning of
‘persecution’ may be explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elaborate on the term in
anticipation of a wide range of potential conduct; and that expanded definition in turn may be influenced by how
practical, or impractical, the standard would be in terms of its application to specific cases. These matters may have
relevance in determining whether its statutory interpretation is a permissible one.”); see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547
U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (per curiam) (on remand, “‘[t]he agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it
can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion
and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.’”) (quoting
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam)).
24
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accountability in the administrative state,” and a “deliberative accountability” that is centered on
participatory goals.28 The Professors only conclusorily assert that “[p]olicymaking through
adjudication may not be an adequate substitute for rulemaking under an ‘elections matter’
accountability theory,” seemingly basing this contention on a comparison of adjudication versus
rulemaking rather than the inherent lack of political accountability in immigration adjudication.29
Regarding deliberative shortcomings, they rely on purported shortcomings in the decisional
process of the Attorney General on review. I think the Professors’ concerns are overblown, and
that political accountability is certainly present in the immigration system.
The Attorney General is, under the text of the statute, the chief administrator of the INA.30
The Board acts only as his delegate, and only within the context in which he has delegated his
authority to the Board to act.31 As the Attorney General’s delegate, the Board must still exercise
its own independent judgment,32 and its decisions are deemed its own and not attributable to the
Attorney General.33 Moreover, a corollary to the regulatory requirement that the Board’s decisions
are a reflection of its own independent judgment, the Attorney General may not attempt to
influence or dictate the decisions of the Board.34 But the regulations do safeguard the Attorney
General’s fundamental role in immigration adjudication, by permitting him to decide cases he opts
to refer to himself, or in which the Board or the Department of Homeland Security requests his
review.35 Through exercise of this authority, “the Attorney General is the final arbiter of the
immigration agency’s interpretation of a statute[.]”36
Exercise of this authority fits squarely with an “elections matter” conception of Executive
Branch accountability. The Trump Administration Attorneys General utilized the authority to
implement an immigration policy that tracked with what the campaign promised it would do, a
policy implementation that followed the election returns.37 Likewise, I have recently argued that
28

See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1231-32 (citations omitted).
See ibid.
30
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1103(g).
31
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (“The Board shall function as an appellate body charged with the review of those
administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it.”); see also 5 Fed.
Reg. 2454 (July 1, 1940) (“the Board of Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall have authority to
exercise the powers of the Attorney General” in certain delineated cases).
32
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) (“Subject to these governing standards, Board members shall exercise their
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the Board, and a panel
or Board member to whom a case is assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and
the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.”) .
33
See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 608, 613 n.1 (S.D. Fl. 1997) (“the decision of the BIA is not factually, nor legally,
the decision of the Attorney General”).
34
See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) (“In unequivocal terms the
regulations delegate to the Board discretionary authority as broad as the statute confers on the Attorney General; the
scope of the Attorney General’s discretion became the yardstick of the Board’s. And if the word ‘discretion’ means
anything is a statutory or administrative grant of power, it means that the recipient must exercise his authority
according to his own understanding and conscience. This applies with equal force to the Board and the Attorney
General. In short, as long as the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep
the Board or dictate its decision in any manner.”).
35
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h).
36
Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F.Supp.2d 1136, 1149 (D.Colo. 2013).
37
See Patrick J. Glen, Robert F. Kennedy and the Attorney General’s Referral Authority: A Blueprint for the Biden
Administration, ** HOFSTRA L. REV. ** (2021).
29
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the Biden Administration should utilize the authority to implement its preferred immigration
policy within the limits the authority permits.38
Other Attorneys General have also utilized the referral authority in a manner that squares
with this aspect of the political accountability theory. A few examples: Attorneys General in the
Reagan and Bush Administrations referred the deportation case of a United Kingdom citizen based
on foreign policy concerns and the impact on the U.S.-U.K. relationship;39 Attorney General Reno
referred the Board’s decision in Matter of R-A-, rejecting the claim of an asylum applicant that
victims of domestic violence constitute a “particular social group,” based on the concerns of
advocates which had also led the Clinton Administration to propose rule-making on the same
issue;40 Attorney General Mukasey referred a decision on female genital mutilation and reversed
the Board’s restrictive opinion after an outcry from advocates and direct pleas by lawmakers and
advocates to intervene;41 and Attorney General Holder referred a same-sex civil union case and
remanded for further proceedings amid the Obama Administration’s deliberations over whether to
continue defending the Defense Of Marriage Act.42 This list is not exhaustive,43 but it does
establish the Attorney General as the final arbiter in immigration proceedings when necessary to
take into account potential political ramifications of the decision. That it does not happen more
often does not point to a lack of political accountability in immigration adjudication, but to the fact
that that adjudication—unlike other areas of administrative law—rarely implicates questions that
would place the need for political accountability front and center.
In the course of conducting these adjudications, the Attorney General also far more often
than not (almost invariably, in fact) meets the conditions under the “deliberative democracy”
conception of political accountability. When the Attorney General accepts a case on referral,
briefing from the parties is normally contemplated, and immigration advocates have usually been
invited to participate as amicus, as well.44 This is not a regulatory requirement, nor does every
case elicit a request for responses from the parties. But in those cases where such briefs are
solicited (the overwhelming majority), it is difficult to see why that public invitation and the
briefing it may prompt is substantially less important from a participatory point of view than the
publication of a proposed rule with its own invitation for comments. This process also has
38

See generally id.
See Deportation Proceedings for Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 13 Op. O.L.C. 1 (1989); Deportation Proceedings
of Joseph Patrick Thomas Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1 (1988); see also Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing
Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 88286 (2016).
40
See Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (AG 2001); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39, at 886-89.
41
See Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (AG 2008); see also Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39, at 861-63.
42
See Matter of Dorman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 485 (AG 2011); see also Glen, supra note 37, at *****.
43
For more on the history of Attorney General decisions, see generally Gonzales & Glen, supra note 39 (focusing on
decisions issued in the Bush II and Obama Administrations, with reference to additional decisions in the Reagan, Bush
I, and Clinton Administrations); Glen, supra note 37 (addressing the decisions issued during the Kennedy, Clinton,
and Obama Administrations).
44
See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 187 (AG 2018) (referring the case, directing briefing on specific issues,
and inviting “interested amici to submit briefs”); Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of
L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 245 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of M-G-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 469 (AG 2018) (same); Matter
of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 476 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (AG 2018) (same); Matter
of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (AG 2018) (same); Matter of Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 495 (AG 2018) (same);
Matter of Thomas & Thompson, 27 I. & N. Dec. 556 (AG 2019) (same); Matter of Reyes, 27 I. & N. Dec. 708 (AG
2019) (same); Matter of A-M-R-C-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 7 (AG 2020) (same).
39
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sufficient transparency. The public is not privy to the decision-making process of the Attorney
General in the course of rendering his decision on a referred case, but neither is it privy to the
consideration of submitted comments and what responses they may trigger from the interested
agencies engaged in a rule-making. In both cases, the public does see the final result—the Attorney
General’s decision with arguments accepted or rejected and the reasoning for the relevant
determinations, and the Final Rule with comments noted and the agencies’ response
memorialized—but in neither is there any significant transparency concerning how the agency
arrived at that final determination.
C. The Expertise of the Board of Immigration Appeals
The Professors also fault the agency for a lack of relevant “expertise” for Chevron
purposes.45 Although there is some force to aspects of their argument—scientific knowledge and
expertise may be entirely lacking in the immigration context, while technical expertise, too, may
be less important than in other areas—other aspects seem incomplete or wrong. Here, I deal with
two issues: the concept of “legislative expertise,” which in my (perhaps idiosyncratic) conception
the Board does possess, and “craft expertise,” which, given the case flows through the agency, the
Board could be expected to have in spades.46
First, the Professors argue that the Board lacks “[l]egislative [e]xpertise,” defined as “the
expertise derived from the principal-agent relationship between Congress and the agency.”47 The
Professors contend that “[t]his specialized knowledge of legislative purpose and process should
only matter, from a Chevron-expertise perspective, if the agency statutory interpreter possesses
that expertise—either directly because the interpreter helped draft the statute or indirectly because
the interpreter interacts with the agency personnel who possess that expertise[.]”48 There is no
question that Board members do not themselves assist with the drafting or review of legislation,
and no reason to believe they have any interactions with agency personnel that do, so in one sense
there is force to the Professors’ argument.
But I believe the concept of “legislative expertise” is given too-narrow a definition in the
Professors’ argument. In a more fundamental sense, the Board does have important insights into
relevant legislative policies and purposes, because immigration enactments have largely unfolded
45

See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1215-24.
Although not a central focus of their argument, the Professors also argue that no “legal or policy expertise in
immigration or foreign relations” is required to become a member of the Board. See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1,
at 1217-19. That is true in one sense, as a lack of such knowledge is not disqualifying, but untrue in another, as
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in the past three to four decades as a complicated case of action and reaction, with the Board and
courts of appeals constituting the “action” and Congress providing the “reaction.” The major
amendments to the asylum statute made by the REAL ID Act of 2005, for instance, including new
provisions relating to the burden of proof, credibility assessments, and corroboration requirements,
were meant to codify existing Board standards as against contrary precedent in the Ninth Circuit.49
Congress having looked to the Board itself for the statement of the proper standards, who better
than the Board to interpret any gaps or ambiguities left in those provisions? And, in fact,
knowledge of this legislative background—the rules Congress wanted to reject and the policies it
was interested in advancing—has informed the Board’s interpretation of these provisions, and
produced exactly the type of decision that should qualify for deference under the terms of
Chevron.50
The REAL ID Act is not an isolated instance, either. In the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),51 Congress made numerous changes to the INA
premised on issues that arose through administrative and federal litigation, including: amending
the definition of conviction to adopt certain aspects of the Board’s prevailing definition, while
rejecting others;52 eliminating suspension of deportation and replacing it with cancellation of
removal, including a heightened hardship standard deemed necessary because of lax application
of the prior “extreme hardship” standard;53 and clarifying certain issues relating to when a
qualifying relationship must exist for purposes of certain waivers of inadmissibility.54 In other
words, the base-line for many of the shifts in IIRIRA was Board precedent, and thus the Board is
well-placed to understand: 1) what the prior rule was; 2) how Congress altered that rule; and 3)
what that alteration means for purposes of a permissible interpretation going forward. 55 This of
course tracks quite nicely with the concept of “legislative experience” offered by the authors. Their
error, it seems to me, was reading that concept too narrowly to exclude the institutional knowledge
the agency has by virtue of its central interpretive role in the relevant statutory scheme.
Second, the Professors posit the possibility that the Board may possess “craft expertise,”
relying on the work of Professor Sidney Shapiro.56 Professor Shapiro advances a conception of
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“institutional expertise,” tied to the “unique wisdom of [the] regulatory agency,” and ultimately
premised on “experience” rather than “formal knowledge.”57 With tens of thousands of appeals
resolved each year, the Board could be expected to possess “craft expertise” in spades, and in fact
Professor Wadhia and Walker feint in that direction initially.58 Ultimately, they conclude that the
issue of craft expertise does not weigh in the Board’s favor for two reasons: 1) statutory
ambiguities in the INA rarely implicate the foundational issues of expertise relevant to the concept;
and 2) even if the Board does possess some craft expertise, it is a lesser form of expertise compared
to other agency actors in the rulemaking process.59
Fairly construed, the calculus seems to weigh in the other direction. By dint of resolving
tens of thousands of cases annually, presenting variations on a relatively firm set of themes, the
Board does augment its understanding of the immigration laws generally, as well as how they
specifically apply to certain circumstances. Considering the concept of “particular social group”
in the refugee definition, for instance, the Board may hone its understanding of the general concept
as the issue is raised across a variety of circumstances, while also sharpening its application to
specifics that may be presented over and over again. By having to resolve the question
continuously, the Board’s expertise as a general and specific matter begins to far outstrip other
actors in the bureaucracy. It may be true that some questions do not implicate technical or
scientific expertise, but many, if not most, that are resolved through precedential decision-making
will involve matters peculiar to the agency’s institutional mission, like the “particular social group”
interpretation noted above. In cases where the Board issues a precedential decision, that decision
is likely the end product of having considered the issue in hundreds, thousands, or even tens of
thousands of other cases, with the precedent-setting decision marking the culmination of this
expansive decisional process. Not only does the Board possess the institutional expertise posited
by Professor Shapiro, because of the sheer breadth of its workload it is difficult to imagine an
agency that could claim greater “craft expertise.”
The comparative expertise argument also seems weak. The Professors do note that the
focus of the Board on immigration issues and the stream of cases mean that the agency possesses
greater comparative expertise than the federal courts.60 But there is little reason to believe that the
Board does not also possess greater “craft expertise” than other agency experts. Again tying this
to work-flow, the Board will have seen a particular issue raised in virtually every possible
circumstance in which it can be raised, giving it a more expansive view of the legal playing field
than other experts tied solely to the language of the statute or legal imagination. Given the number
of cases decided by immigration judges, and the possibilities of the fully panoply of issues under
the INA being appealed to the Board, it is the Board that has the most comprehensive view of
immigration law of virtually any actor in the field. The number of appeals considered and resolved
each year, and the range of issues presented therein, dwarf the scope of rule-making. In other
words, if there is institutional expertise borne of practice, the Board can comfortably claim that
mantle in the immigration context.

57

Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Exerptise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the
Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2015).
58
See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1223.
59
Id. at 1223-24.
60
See Wadhia & Walker, supra note 1, at 1223.

11

III. RULE-MAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION
The Professors’ arguments against Chevron deference to immigration adjudications are not
free-standing attacks against the concept, but rather the framework they utilize to advance their
main normative argument: that at least so far as immigration policy-making is concerned, the
agencies should categorically prefer rule-making to adjudication. For me, because I do not believe
in the strength of their arguments against the applicability of Chevron deference to immigration
adjudications, I remain at best agnostic about the choice between adjudication and rule-making.
But I also believe that, even on its own terms, the Professors’ argument relies on an idealized
conception of rule-making where, in reality, the purported gulf between the desirability of these
options is substantially narrower (or non-existent).
At the threshold, there is no question—and the Professors do not argue to the contrary—
that when given the choice to proceed via rule-making or adjudication, the choice is entirely within
the discretion of the agency.61 Likewise, under controlling precedent, deference is warranted in
either case, so long as the agency is fulfilling its statutory mandate and Congress has not
unambiguously foreclosed the interpretation or decision made by the agency.62 The provision of
this choice makes sense, as some issues may be amendable to either rule-making or adjudication,
for others there are considerations that may weigh more heavily in favor of the one rather than the
other, and for still others the choice may be directed by statute or the nature of the policy question
being resolved.
Using just the asylum statute as an example, all these dynamics can be seen at work. The
Attorney General may, “by regulation,” “designate offenses that will be considered to be”
disqualifying particularly serious crimes or serious nonpolitical crimes for purposes of asylum
eligibility,63 “may . . . establish additional limitations and conditions . . . under which an alien shall
be ineligible for asylum,”64 and “may provide . . . other conditions or limitations on the
consideration of an application for asylum[.]”65 He also “shall establish a procedure for the
consideration of asylum applications filed under” the statute.66 These are issues that by their nature
or by specific direction of the statute must be resolved via rule-making. In contrast, the definition
of “particular social group,” one of the statutorily protected grounds on which basis an alien may
assert eligibility for asylum, is an issue that would be amenable to either rule-making or
adjudication. The Board has established broad criteria to consider in assessing whether a particular
social group qualifies as such,67 but it is possible that such criteria could have been promulgated
See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“the choice made between proceeding by general rule
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via regulation, as well. No final rule on “particular social groups” has ever been promulgated, but
the Clinton Administration did issue a draft rule that would have addressed some of these
questions.68 In contrast with the initial examples in this paragraph, however, there is nothing about
resolving the ambiguity inherent in the term “particular social group” that makes rule-making or
adjudication the preferred course of action—policy could be established through either
mechanism. But then consider application of that generally promulgated framework to specific
proposed social groups, whether it is victims of domestic abuse, the nuclear family, former gang
members, or wealthy returning deportees. Rule-making cannot exhaustively address each and
every conceivable proposed social group, even if it could establish the parameters for considering
when such a group could be recognized.69 Instead, adjudication, by considering each question on
a case-by-case basis, can provide greater form and context for interpretation of the ambiguous
term, and in so doing should be entitled to deference consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction
in cases such as Cardoza-Fonseca and Aguirre-Aguirre.70
Presenting rule-making as an all-or-nothing option if an agency wants to obtain deference
on review fails to take into account these differences inherent in the multitude of issues raised
before and considered by agencies. At the very least, failing to meaningfully grapple with these
questions undercuts the force of the Professors adamant turn to rule-making in the immigration
context. To be sure, on one level the question is not the choice itself but the result of that choice,
and even there the Professors’ argument resorts to the extension of some deference (just not
Chevron).71 Regardless of these points, however, the end result is the same: for the agencies’
policy choices to receive the deference due them under Chevron, they must proceed through rulemaking to the exclusion of adjudication.
Despite the foregoing, the Professors’ Manichean approach might make sense if rulemaking were some sort panacea for all the ills they raise regarding immigration adjudication. On
a clear-eyed view, though, it is not. The shortcomings of rule-making may be different in kind or
scope than those of adjudication, but they are shortcomings nonetheless. The concerns noted by
the Professors ultimately provide no support for their aggressive argument in favor of rule-making.
Returning, first, to the question of expertise; in arguing against relevant expertise by agency
adjudicators, the Professors framed that perceived lack against the greater benefits of expertise
offered by other individuals within the subject agencies.72 The question of comparative expertise
seems closer to a wash, however. There are undoubtedly other experts at EOIR, DHS, and DOJ,
who have meaningful contributions to make in the course of rule-making (as well as the antecedent
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step of statutory revision and drafting), but there is little reason to view any of these discrete experts
as in possession of substantially more knowledge than the adjudicators and their adjutants.
Regarding the aggregation of expertise, in the course of rule-making the agencies may benefit from
multiple different viewpoints being brought to bear on a single problem—EOIR may be able to
explain adjudicative issues posed by the rule, DHS operational impact, and DOJ potential litigation
fall-out.73 Here, the benefits of rule-making in the abstract may seem formidable, but with any
precedential decision the Board will have the views of its own expert members, the staff of EOIR
who work for the Board, and the views of DHS via briefing and possibly argument. The slate of
experts available to the Board is certainly less than what would be available to the administration
via rule-making, but this should also be considered within the scope of the decisions being
rendered. As explained above, issues that are peculiarly subject to adjudication are also
substantially less likely to benefit from the kind of aggregation of expertise encouraged by the rulemaking process. Interpreting the term “particular social group” is of a different kind of exercise
than promulgating procedures to guide the filing and consideration of asylum applications. The
aggregation issue arises only through posing a false equivalency between issues considered in rulemaking and those considered in adjudication.
The nature of expertise is also a tricky concept in this area. As I argue above, I believe that
the Board has substantial institutional expertise that arises because of the impetus behind much of
Congress’s reforms over the past decades. Those reforms have occurred with Board precedent in
mind, and thus the Board is peculiarly well-placed to understand what Congress was doing and
why. I also agree with the Professors, however, that others within the immigration bureaucracy
may have important contributions to make regarding the same question.74 The Professors note in
this regard the Board’s inability to access this expertise because of the Chinese wall between the
adjudicator and other policy-makers,75 and use that fact as an argument against deference to the
Board itself. But if that wall is blocking a flow of information, it is blocking that flow from both
directions. The Board may not have access to other experts’ views, but then those same experts
do not have access to the Board’s own expert views and what could be its singular insights into
the motivating factors of statutory amendments. Where the Professors see only a shortcoming
insofar as the Board itself is concerned, I see a two-way street whereby experts engaged in rulemaking have only a limited universe of expertise to consider, while the Board itself has only a
slightly differently constituted limited universe of expertise to consider. Both procedures lack
something, and given that—along with my more generally supportive views of Board expertise in
the course of adjudication—I can find no expertise-based reason to categorically prefer rulemaking while withdrawing adjudication from the scope of Chevron deference.
Political accountability also seems more or less a wash. Given the possibilities of Attorney
General referral, adjudication via that avenue provides as much political accountability as does
Executive agency rule-making. In both cases, voters know where the buck has stopped. I also
disagree that rule-making is inherently preferable from the perspective of public participation.
Here, the Professors are quite bullish on the benefits of rule-making, which seem superficially
clear: a rule is proposed, the public is invited to review and comment, and the administration then
considers the comments (sometimes in the hundreds of thousands) individually (!) and drafts a
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final rule taking into consideration all these concerns and comments. The notion that this process
is actually engaged in soliciting and considering public views to the ends of altering the agencies’
preferred rules is at best in tension with reality. Writing in an earlier version of the Duke
administrative law symposium, Professor E. Donald Elliott, formerly a Public Member of the
Administrative Conference of the United States and Assistant Administrator and General Counsel
of the Environmental Protection Agency, remarked that “[n]o administrator in Washington turns
to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input
from interested parties.”76 No doubt informed by his own personal experience, Professor Elliott
offered a telling simile: “Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese
Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the
essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.”77 This is not to say that rulemaking is not informed by public concerns as well as interested constituents, but only that that
process is not likely to occur within the confines of rule-making itself.78 The notice-and-comment
process is now quite formal and driven by compliance with statutory standards, and the bare-fact
of meeting those standards (while also compiling the record on which the rule will be defended in
the federal courts)—not “provid[ing] . . . public input into government thinking—is the
“primary[]” function of the process.79
A comparison of those parties submitting comments to the prior administration in the
immigration rule-making context would, I would wager, align highly with the interested amicus
submitting briefs before the Attorney General in referred cases. Professor Wadhia specifically has
been an active amicus participant in immigration cases before the Supreme Court, federal courts
of appeals, and district courts. Why is the latter form of participation dramatically different from
the former? The Professors do not pose this question and thus do not answer it, but it is worth
considering. If the essence of the public-participation argument is the ability to be heard, the
opportunities are similar as between rule-making and adjudication in that narrow class of case that
will prompt a decision entitled to deference on review. The opportunities are not identical, and I
do not mean to argue to the contrary—the Board and Attorney General may decide cases without
amicus participation or additional briefing from the parties. But fairly considered, the
opportunities to participate in those adjudications that will lead to a precedential decision are more
robust and important than the Professors acknowledge, while their own preferred course of rulemaking contains only a formalized mechanism of public participation whose actual substantive
importance is open to debate.
All this is to say only that rule-making has its own warts. It is a necessary mechanism for
adopting certain policies, and the route that should be preferred in other classes of cases, as well.
But it is not without its own shortcomings, including as to expertise, accountability, and
participation, and the Professors fail to advance any compelling reason for categorically preferring
rule-making to adjudication in the advancement of administration policy, much less an argument
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for why we should continue to confer deference on rule-makings while withdrawing it from
adjudications.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF, CHEVRON’S RECALIBRATION
This leaves possibilities for reform—assuming Chevron should be recalibrated for
purposes of immigration adjudication, how should that recalibration be accomplished? First, if
Congress wants to eliminate deference for all administrative cases or any subset thereof, there is
no obvious impediment to that action, although I share the Professors’ skepticism that any
substantial reform to deference principles will come through legislation.80 The Professors do note
the possibility of comprehensive immigration reform in the Biden Administration, and this well
may provide an avenue to action on the specific question of deference. But it additionally opens
the door to other ways to cut-back on the circumstances where such deference is relevant—revising
the INA or enacting new provisions that more particularly and explicitly address the relevant
questions rather than more open-ended provisions leaving interpretive discretion with the agency.
Eliminating or cutting-back on the chances an agency would have to render an interpretation
ultimately entitled to deference before the federal courts is as wise a move towards “mitigating”
deference’s reign as would be a wholesale revocation of deference.
Second, perhaps most provocatively, the Professors argue for the Executive Branch to take
the lead by waiving deference in immigration adjudications and “shifting major immigration
policymaking away from adjudication and into the realm of notice-and-comment rulemaking.”81
For support, they note a recent regulation limiting the circumstances where the Department of
Justice will seek deference in the wake of Kisor v. Wilkie’s reconceptualization of Auer
deference.82 I would assume there is no barrier to the Department also doing so in the context of
Chevron deference and defense of immigration adjudications. But the Professors miss an
important point in citing this regulation—the Department sought to ensure that its litigation
unfolded consistent with governing Supreme Court law, and did not push the boundaries by asking
for deference to guidance and internal documents that otherwise would not warrant deference.
That argument is entirely lacking here—the Supreme Court has consistently and emphatically
described immigration adjudication as entitled to deference on judicial review. In promulgating
any contrary Departmental policy or rule, the Department would not be acting to ensure
compliance with Supreme Court law, but would be itself catalyzing a shift away from that law.
This also implicates attorney-client obligations. The Department’s lawyers have higher
obligations and duties regarding the rule of law than private practitioners. 83 This means that in
certain circumstances, the Department will decline to defend otherwise favorable precedent or may
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confess error.84 Along with this obligation, however, is the obligation to defend our client-agencies
within the limits permitted by the law.85 The limits of the law obviously entail not stretching the
text of statutes, regulations, or judicial precedent beyond their reasonable import, but there can be
no colorable argument that those limits also entail voluntarily declining to seek deference in a class
of adjudications that the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us warrant deference. If Chevron
continues to exist, and its application to immigration adjudications continues to be sanctioned,
there is no legal rationale to support the Department’s waiver of deference, and any institutional
interests are purely hypothetical.86
Most importantly, however, voluntary abdication of deference takes the burden off the
entity that should be charged with rethinking the scope of Chevron: the Supreme Court itself.
Deference, as currently conceptualized, stems from Supreme Court precedent and is a canon
applicable to judicial review of agency action. It is thus with the judiciary that the mantle of reform
must ultimately rest. Unless or until the Court seeks to alter the deference calculus, the Executive
is entitled to continue to argue for deference consistent with that precedent. And, of course, this
may already be happening in immigration cases. Former Justice Kennedy criticized the courts of
appeals reflexive recourse to deference in a recent immigration case, where Justice Alito, in his
solo dissent, argued that the majority’s decision was an implicit repudiation of Chevron
deference.87 The Court has also declined to take a position on whether deference is warranted to
immigration adjudications that touch on so-called dual-use statutes, statutes that may entail both
civil and criminal consequences, instead conducting de novo review of the question presented.88
Of course, in the midst of these cases, the Court has continued to apply Chevron deference.89 But
to the extent there are increasingly cases where the Court balks at that application, any necessary
recalibration is likely already underway.
It is also important to address a question the Professors do not raise—what is the practical
effect if immigration adjudications no longer qualify for Chevron deference? Presumably, the
Professors would argue that the elimination of deference would be of significant importance,
otherwise there would be little reason to spend 47 pages arguing for that result in a prestigious law
journal. I am skeptical. In the Supreme Court itself, I see little reason to believe that a lack of
deference will negatively affect the rate at which the government prevails. First, again, many cases
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are already resolved without recourse to Chevron. Second, the cases where Chevron was applied
were not likely to have come out the other way absent a robust conception of deference. The issue
may be more complicated in the courts of appeals, but the Professors certainly do not make any
substantial case for a sea-change in judicial review of immigration adjudications in a hypothetical
post-Chevron world. The points regarding the Supreme Court are likely to be just as important in
the courts of appeals, i.e., many cases are already disposed of on non-deference-related grounds,
while a “better-reading” argument will often favor the position advanced by the government even
in the absence of Chevron deference (whether on de novo review or on application of Skidmore
“deference”). Of course, this may just provide fuel for their argument—if the outcome will not
have catastrophic consequences on the adjudicatory system, why not jettison deference and give a
freer hand to the courts of appeals? That would be a rational counterpunch. For me, however, it
argues for maintenance of the status quo, especially in these circumstances where I think most of
the criticisms of deference lack strength and the proposed alternative of rule-making offers no net
benefits.
CONCLUSION
Professors Wadhia and Walker have written a thoughtful critique of the application of
Chevron deference to immigration adjudications, but for me it ultimately misses the mark. In some
sense I have a dog in this fight, although my interests are more institutional than substantive. The
actual practice of deference in immigration litigation has not engendered any significant problems
in the four decades since Chevron, and unreasonable decisions or those prohibited by the plain
language of the statute will be vacated on review. But where there is ambiguity or room for the
agency to make a policy choice, it is entitled to pursue that decision through adjudication. And
having done so, the courts should defer under the long-accepted principles of Chevron.
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